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Understanding and Self-Organization
Natika W. Newton*
Department of Philosophy, Nassau Community College, State University of New York (SUNY), Garden City, NY, USA
How do wemanage to understand a completely novel state of affairs, such as the sudden
effects of an unexpected earthquake, or the arrival of a total stranger instead of the sister
we were waiting for? In each case, for a moment we might be stunned, but we are able
quite quickly to fit these events into our overall framework for understanding the world.
However, terrified and despairing we feel, we know what earthquakes are and this event
fits that schema; in the case of the stranger we know that this kind of thing happens, and
that we must ask the stranger “Who are you, and where is my sister?” This paper asks
about the mechanisms by which we rapidly achieve an understanding of our world, both
the unexpected changes we may experience, and the ongoing comfortable familiarity
we normally have with our surroundings. We attempt a solution by means of examining
fundamental questions:
• What is it to understand something?
• What sorts of things do we try to understand?
• Is there a conscious EXPERIENCE of understanding?
• Does understanding involve conscious mental images?
• What is self-organization?
I will argue that these questions revolve around the need of a living organism to take
action, and that understanding anything involves knowing how we might act relative
to that thing in our environment. The experience of understanding is a feeling that the
action affordances of a situation are clear and available. Action (as opposed to reaction)
includes imagery, particularly motor imagery, which can be used in the guidance of
action. Understanding requires a conscious process involving motor imagery of action
affordances, and action can be understood only in self-organizational terms. I explain
how self-organization can ground the kinds of action affordance experience needed for
conscious understanding. The paper concludes that our day-to-day understanding of
our environment is the result of a self-organizing process.
Keywords: understanding, self-organization, consciousness, representation, recursion, emergence
WHAT IS IT TO UNDERSTAND SOMETHING?
Answering this question requires distinguishing two ways it can be taken. One way is as a “success”
term, with the assumption that there can be correct and incorrect understanding. Thus, we can
say of someone that she thinks she understands the term “water” if she views water as any clear
liquid that quenches thirst, but that she does not really understand it, being ignorant of the
molecular composition of water. The other way of taking the concept of understanding is purely
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as a mental state of a subject, in which she finds for herself a way
of interpreting something (word, sentence, object, or event) that
allows her to use her interpretation to think about or act upon her
interpretation in a way that satisfies her. We can call this “having
AN understanding” of something. Having an understanding in
this sense does not involve success or failure, as long as the subject
herself is satisfied.
In this paper we are concerned with the second sense of
understanding. The former sense is the subject of philosophy of
language, while the latter sense concerns only what is going on in
the subject’s head—i.e., her nervous system. Reaching a state of
having an understanding is independent of “correct” definitions,
or of knowing the correct meaning in a given language, and
is concerned solely with the subject’s experience. While the
interpretation does not necessarily map onto the objective world,
it allows the subject to use her interpretation to incorporate it
into existing schemas and to create new models consistent with
it. If what she understands in this way is incompatible with the
objective world, she will sooner or later discover this, and will
have to revise her understanding or abandon it for one more
compatible in objective terms. She still has an understanding of
the object or situation, which is again not necessarily accurate,
but which allows her to act on this revised interpretation.
For example, suppose Susan is rude to her friend Tom, who
consequently is hurt and interprets Susan’s behavior as evidence
that she no longer likes him. His understanding of her behavior
satisfies him intellectually, although of course he is disturbed,
and his interpretation allows him to decide to snub her at their
next encounter. But when he does so she bursts into tears, while
his friends tell him that she has been under a great strain and
is seriously depressed. Then Tom will no longer interpret her
rudeness as a sigh of rejection of him personally. Once again, his
new interpretation may be objectively inaccurate, but it provides
an understanding that allows him to interact with Susan in a way
that is intellectually comfortable.
Finally, we can be even more precise by looking at a clear
lack of understanding, in the well-known example of the Chinese
Room (Searle, 1984, discussed at greater length below). Searle
imagines himself going through all the motions of a computer
with a translation function, which receives questions in Chinese
and delivers answers, still in Chinese. Someone on the outside
might well-believe that the computer understands Chinese. But
Searle, as the computer inside the room, knows that he does not
understand, and we can certainly take his word for it.
WHAT SORTS OF THINGS DO WE
UNDERSTAND?
Most commonly, we think of understanding language. But in fact
we must have an understanding of every aspect of our lives—
every object we encounter, every event we are involved in or
witness, everything that is part of our environment. Without this
understanding, we are at a loss as to what to do next. It may sound
strange to speak of understanding an object. But in the case of
any object we need to know what it is for, how we may use it or
avoid it, what actions it affords. Even a meaningless rock lying in
a field can be picked up, thrown, taken home as an ornament,
etc. We might be mistaken in our particular understanding of
an object if we think a rock is a mushroom and try to bite into
it; in that sort of situation we search for a different, we may
say more successful understanding. Leaving some aspect of our
environment not understood is a worry; we have to figure it out
so as to know what to do with it or expect from it. We seek an
understanding of events, such as two people whispering at the
faculty meeting. What can they be whispering about? We are
then able to interpret their whispering as an attempt to locate the
memo referred to by the speaker, and we then can go on to the
next issue in our general attempt to understanding the meeting
as a whole. The unspoken premise here is that being alive is for
us a process in which we are always acting in relation to our
environment, however minimally (Ellis and Newton, 2010). Lack
of understanding obstructs the process of acting, and hence is felt
as a problem.
IS THERE A CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE OF
UNDERSTANDING?
There must be conscious experience, at least in the initial
encounters with a thing, because having an understanding puts
us at ease, enabling us to feel that we can make use of what is
understood, or incorporate it into our global experience. In other
words, the above is what it is like to have an understanding.
Lacking any understanding leads to puzzlement and a feeling
of insecurity or discomfort: what are we supposed to do in this
situation? If we are in an apathetic state because of depression or
if we are sufficiently distracted by something else, we may not try
to understand (This experience can also be common when we do
not care whether we understand or not, as during a murky movie
when we have given up and stay only because of politeness).
But if we are called upon to DO something about the thing, or
perform some actions in light of it, we must attempt to arrive at
an understanding, to incorporate the thing into the rest of our
current situation.
The discomfort of lacking an understanding—“What’s going
on?”—leads to attempts to arrive at an understanding, and when
we are successful there is the well-known “Ah-ha!” experience.
This is normally a positive experience—the discomfort is eased—
unless understanding reveals the object to be scary, dangerous
or sad. Even then, we are better off for knowing how to react.
As we grow accustomed to our familiar environment we take the
understanding for granted; if someone brings me coffee while I
am working I need not go through a moment of puzzlement,
unless this offer of coffee is not at all typical of the normal
behavior of this person. Then I might ask some questions. The
upshot is that normally, when we have an understanding, we are
comfortable in our surroundings, without much thought, and we
are unpleasantly aware when we lack it. So we may speak of the
“A-hah!” experience, and the “What’s going on?” experience, as
what it is like to have or lack an understanding.
It should be clearly noted that we have access to our state of
understanding—we may say “privileged access”—we know when
we understand something and when we do not. It can be argued
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that we have no special access to our mental states, which are
determined in part by the environment. But this objection applies
to the first sense of understanding discussed above, which we are
not concerned with in this paper. Here, having an understanding
is a state of which the subject is fully aware. “Accuracy” of
understanding does not apply. In some situations I might pretend
to understand what’s going on, when I really do not. No one else
may notice, but I know the difference. This situation can lead to
social complexities and confusion, but I myself am usually aware
of my role in the awkwardness.
John Searle’s “The Chinese Room” is rich in examples. Searle
argues that the computational theory of mind—the theory
that thinking is manipulating symbols, meaningless themselves,
that we have learned correspond to objects and events in the
environment—is not accurate. His main argument, that syntax
does not yield semantics, uses the well-known example of a
person inside a closed room, manipulating Chinese symbols in
response to input, matching input with output by following
rules in a book. According to computationalism, Searle says,
correct manipulation—syntax—should be equivalent to knowing
Chinese. But in that case, Searle said, the person handling the
symbols should understand Chinese. Searle, imagining himself
as the person in the room KNOWS that he does not understand
Chinese. So the computational theory is false.
Not only does he know that he doesn’t understand Chinese,
he knows how to read and obey the instructions in the English
manual. His knowledge is made clear, to us and to him, by the
fact that he obeys the instructions with no difficulty. To provide a
personal anecdote: I was once playing a word game with another
person, who for a while seemed to be keeping up with the rules.
But she claimed not to understand what she was doing, but was
just lucky; when I explained the rules to her, she repeated that
she had not understood how the game was played, but that now
she did. She clearly described states of not understanding, and
of understanding; it seems to follow that those states yielded
conscious, reportable experiences (This example is discussed in
Newton, 1996).
DOES UNDERSTANDING INVOLVE
CONSCIOUS MENTAL IMAGERY?
Mental images have traditionally been thought of as primarily
visual—a picture of something is often called an image while
a 3-D representation of a structure is a model; an annoying,
persistent memory of a tune is “a tune in one’s head.” But tunes
in one’s head are no different from pictures in one’s head in their
central function: they are imagined reproductions of past audio-
visual stimuli that we have experienced and now remember. We
can recall flavors—taste images; pains—pain images; extreme
temperatures—heat or cold images. There seem to be no sensory
experiences that cannot be reproduced as mental images: they are
like the actual experiences, but are no longer objectively present
(Pearson and Kosslyn, 2015).
We can also have proprioceptive images, images of events
in our bodies, such as hunger pangs, or motor images, which
reproduce the sensations of moving parts of our bodies. Motor
images have received much attention in recent years for their role
in generating overt bodily movements (Sacks, 1984). According
to Jeannerod (1988), movements of our limbs begin with imagery
of the movement in the motor cortex; this imagery is activated
by allowed to proceed to the sending of nerve impulses to the
muscles, which execute the movement. The action can also be
prevented prior execution by inhibitory signals in the cortex.
Proponents of free will argue that while arm movements can be
predicted prior to execution by activation of the motor image,
there is still time for the action to be inhibited at the last minute;
during this short time the subject can choose inhibition or not
(Libet, 1985, p. 143). Whether or not this account is successful
will not be discussed in this short paper.
We have seen that having an understanding of something
means knowing how one might use or interact with the object
or event to be understood. If, as we have argued, there is a
feeling of understanding that is conscious, then this feeling must
consist in the experience of representations or imagery of some
of the possible interactions. For example, suppose you enter an
unfamiliar gym and see a novel type of equipment. You can ask
how one uses it, or you can simply look at it and try to figure out
where the feet go, where the arms go, what types of motion the
equipment allows. You are trying to understand the equipment,
and the attempt entails sensorimotor imagery of interacting with
the machine, imaging what the motions will feel like to execute,
etc. You can do all this while passively observing the machine.
Is there any other way of coming to understand the machine?
Suppose you ask the attendant to explain it; can’t you understand
and apply his verbal information (“you step on the foot pedals
and hold on to those bars”) without producing motor images in
your head? No; the images let you know if you can do what he
says. Don’t we do that kind of thing all the time? That question
takes us back to the discussion of conscious understanding. It
was argued that having an understanding of something means
knowing how one might interact with it, use it, participate with
it in some way. Often this kind of knowing is non-verbal. For
example, you know how to keep your balance on a bicycle while
riding it, and you can imagine doing so. But if you are asked
to verbalize this knowledge you may be at a loss. When riding,
you tighten and flex muscles, and shift your body weight around,
in ways that feel automatic, that you can image clearly through
proprioceptive and motor imagery. Confronting a bicycle with
understanding, we might say, means generating an image of how
you would ride it (And if you cannot generate such an image you
will feel, or protest, that you don’t know how to ride it). Thus of
the two apparently possible ways of having an understanding of
riding a bicycle, only the way involving imagery will be satisfying
to you. Hearing the explanation without knowing what it would
be like for you to ride it does not help you understand, if you do
not understand the elements of the explanation. And knowing
what it would be like for you to ride is being able to generate
imagery of your body in the act of riding. Thus, having an
understanding of something involves conscious mental imagery.
The only exception will be in cases where you have performed the
act so often that you feel sure, without mental rehearsal, that you
are familiar with the object or event. But even in those cases, your
feeling of confidence can be an “image,” in an attenuated sense of
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image, of traces of the “Aha” feeling that you achieved when you
originally developed an understanding.
Try an experiment: suppose you are asked if you are able to
reach the vase on top of the bookcase. How do you decide? If
you aren’t sure, try introspection. Do you not imagine standing
in front of the bookcase and reaching up? Perhaps you have a
motor image of standing on your toes and straining to touch the
vase. If that image leaves you undecided, you can walk over and
try to reach the vase, and get the right answer.
It can be objected that if you know quantitatively the height of
the bookcase, and your own height with your arm length added,
you could find the answer with no imagery necessary. And the
objection is correct, in that you can now find the answer by
simple addition. But that fact leads to another case of conscious
or semi-conscious motor imagery: the dependence of arithmetic
on representation of basic action patterns. Let us look in detail
at the most abstract way we use action imagery. I have been
defending the claim that understanding, in the sense that once
has AN understanding of something, is a process that maps novel
stimuli or experiences onto an original structure that is already
understood. The novel material, thus mapped, is understood as
well as the original material, in that it has become part of the
subject’s repertoire of usable structures, or mental models.
For example, suppose we call an original structure “reach,
grasp, pull.” This structure emerged, let us say, when the infant
first saw a desirable toy and grabbed it. The structure of that act
is the act itself; it is understood because it is created by the infant
in response to her own desire. It is the means of satisfying that
desire. Now that she has that movement pattern in her repertoire
she can use it at will to obtain other desirable things. She is also
now ready to use that pattern in other circumstances, to interpret
concepts or environmental input that goes beyond immediate
satisfaction of a desire for an object. Suppose she is now older
and is told she will be taken to a store to buy new shoes. She can
understand that prospect easily once she can see it as another
instance of “reach, grasp, pull;” going to the store is reaching,
selecting, holding, and buying the shoes is grasping, and wearing
the shoes home is pulling.
What about the novel qualitative and quantitative properties
that are structured by the familiar pattern? How are they
understood? It seems correct to say that they are experienced
as properties of the fundamental pattern, and are not viewed
as distinct from that pattern, but as features of experience that
merge with the pattern. If they are purely qualitative, they can be
experienced but not described except in terms of a pattern. In
describing quantitative properties of the shoes, other recursive
patterns will be applied to the details of buying the shoes, the
trip, the transaction, etc. E.g., the car is a thing that you get
into, and that moves you from point A–B. The red color of
the shoes, on the other hand, cannot be described but only
experienced and named. Sensory qualities like the smell of the
leather, the smoothness, the heft of the shoe are unanalyzable,
but as properties of the object are subject to the object’s handling
and do not need sensorimotor patterns of their own. In general,
qualia are presented to us as bound to objects and events
we understand through motor imagery, and do not present
philosophical difficulties in ordinary circumstances.
We can abandon sensory qualities in purely abstract contexts
likemathematics. Now imagine that a child is learning how to add
three digit numbers, and must understand what it is to “carry” a
numeral. The “reach, grasp, pull” pattern can be applied in an
attenuated form here: when we add 123–789, for example, we
must “carry” the one from the rightmost column to the middle
one, where it is incorporated into the sum of 8 and 2. The
term “carry” is clearly metaphorical and derived from physical
operations: “add” can be understood in terms of placing one
object into a collection of others, “divide” in terms of separating
n sets of objects from a larger collection, etc. Note that the “reach,
grasp, pull” structure is only one of many metaphors based on
bodily movements in space: into and out of are derived from
experience with containers in which we can put things or find
ourselves inside of; and they can structure metaphors in vastly
different contexts—e.g., “the voters put him in office”; or “three
goes into nine three times.”
The basic point here is very simple: we understand our
bodies in being able to move them and use them to satisfy
our wants and needs. Understanding anything has its roots in
this ability. Our bodies are our tools for achieving our goals,
and there is nothing more to having an understanding of them
than intentionally moving them. Because our essence as agents
is expressed in conscious, voluntary bodily activity, then having
an understanding of our own voluntary actions is itself nothing
more than being intentionally able to engage in bodily activity or
imaging it (knowing what it is like). We understand ourselves,
moreover, as voluntary agents. Being self-aware is being aware of
our bodies, not as something we, as disembodied subjects, have,
but as what we are.
Understanding anything, in the sense we are using it, involves
situating it into contexts or structures with which we are already
familiar. As a person grows and acquires new experiences,
the original sensorimotor structures of early life stretch to
accommodate these experiences in ways that he can “make sense”
of, in light of the earlier experiential structures. It is hard to
imagine how one could develop any understanding of novelties
except by connecting them with prior experience. An example
from academia is the teaching of Plato’s Theory of the Forms.
The instructor is helpless to explain what a Form is unless she
can find something in students’ experience to relate it to. She
can try beginning, for example, by explaining that Plato’s realm
of Forms is to the world of concrete objects as, in Christianity,
Heaven is to Earth. The success of this move depends upon the
students’ understanding of Christianity, and that understanding
depends, in turn, in part on spatial metaphors such as “above,”
for Heaven, and “below” for Earth. In other words, trying to
explain a complex new concept in terms pertaining only to that
concept, with no terms from the hearer’s experience to ground the
explanation, is useless. The hearer can learn which new words to
use with which other new words, but, like Searle in the Chinese
Room, will have no grounded understanding of the concept
that she can use to think about it in a satisfying and possibly
creative way.
Yufik and Friston propose a theory of understanding (this
issue) that is highly compatible with that of this paper,
except that their theory focuses on neuronal events underlying
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understanding, while this one is more concerned with mental
acts on a conscious level. One might say that their theory is
more “bottom up,” mine more “top down.” Importantly, both
theories exemplify enactivism—the view that cognition is a mode
of human activity, and both theories emphasize the role of action
representations, or mental models:
Notice the two key themes of this formulation are an emphasis
on active inference or volitional sampling of the world—of
the sort that characterizes enactivist or situation approaches to
cognition. Second, the progressive elaboration of internalized (“as
if ”) stimulus-response links induces conditional dependencies
between the sensory input and internal models of how those
predictions were caused—through active sampling (Yufik and
Friston, 2016).
In summary: Understanding is tightly coupled with the need
of a living organism to take action. Understanding involves
knowing how we might perform goal-directed actions relative to
the environment. The experience of understanding is a feeling
that the action affordances of a situation are not entirely unclear.
Action (as opposed to reaction) requires imagery, including
motor imagery, that can be used in the guidance of action.
SELF-ORGANIZATION
With this sketch of a theory of understanding, we will attempt
to see it as a self-organizing process. To do that requires that we
first consider it as a recursive process. Not all cases of recursion
are biological, like our theory of understanding. Just as many
writers view intentionality as a property of natural language,
logic, mathematics, and language provide instances of recursion:
the application of a function to its own values to generate an
infinite sequence of values. “Recursion occurs when a thing is
defined in terms of itself or of its type” (Wikipedia, Recursion).
In what follows we examine the concept of self-organization
particularly as it takes place in an organism—self-organization
as a biological property. The much broader research project
originated in applications to dynamical systems theory (Ashby,
1947), followed by physics, chemistry, computer science, and
more recently to human behavior. A major influence was
the work of I. Prigogine on self-organization in irreversible
thermodynamic systems, for which he won the Nobel Prize for
Chemistry in 1977 (Prigogine and Nicolis, 1977). Among other
central thinkers is Hermann Haken who finds highly important
examples of self-organization in brain function (Haken, 2008;
Karsenti, 2008).
Below we look at two properties central to self-organization
in any type of system, including the brain and human cognitive
functions in general.
RECURSION
Language is recursive when a type of clause in a sentence is used
to make a new sentence. For example “Bobby went to the store”
can become a new sentence “Bobby went to the store and to the
pharmacy,” and “Bobby went to the store and to the pharmacy,
and to the movies.” The prepositional phrase “to the store” is
a grammatical function within the sentence, and that function
can be infinitely repeated to make new sentences. Mathematics
is recursive when a number series n is extended by “n+1” and
“n+1+1.”
Recursion is part of a complete definition of language and
mathematics, and the concept has been used to deny language
ability to intelligent non-human animals. Recursion also occurs
naturally in non-living entities such as crystals (e.g., snowflakes
and blocks of quartz), and it frequently results in emergent
properties, such as the symmetry of crystals, the shapes of flocks
of flying birds, or traffic patterns, which maintain their overall
shapes as their sizes change.
Metaphors are essential tools in understanding, both linguistic
and otherwise. We understand something by being able to see
it in terms of something we already understand. That fact may
help to explain our inability to articulate a definition of sensory
properties like color; red itself has no articulable components that
can be compared to or mapped onto anything else (Lakoff and
Johnson, 1987).
The examples of recursion we have been examining include
both inanimate, fixed structures like language and mathematics,
events like presidential elections, and animate biological
processes. We have argued that understanding is a biological
process, based on recursive iteration of action structures, or
action images. The importance of recursion in our theory of
understanding is that, through recursive processes in which
structures are extended to new data, the new material is
understood simply by being incorporated into a wider context
already fully understood.
We are now ready to understand how forming an
understanding of elements in our environment involves
emergent properties.
EMERGENT PROPERTIES
Emergent properties are properties of the patterns resulting from
self-organizing processes that are not present in, or predictable
from, the individual components that have been organized. A
well-known example is traffic patterns: “In the case of a traffic
jam, what appears is an entity whose properties need not have
anything in common with the properties of its constituent units
(cars). In particular, one may have a stationery or even moving
back traffic jam while all cars are moving forward. This higher
level structure, whose equations ofmotion are not easily derivable
from those of cars, emerges from the interactions between the
cars” (Bonabeau et al., 1995). Because the properties are not
properties of the individual “agents” but only of the organized
whole, these properties are “emergent;” meaning that they did
not exist previously in nature, and could not have been predicted
from the properties of the “agents.” They are more than, and
different from, a mere aggregate of the agents that make it up
(Anderson, 2011).
Another important feature of emergent properties is that they
have causal powers not found in the individual entities making
them up. Traffic patterns, when they cause tie-ups in the traffic
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flow, cause not only traffic jams but also extreme irritation on
the part of the drivers involved. But the traffic jams and the
irritation are not caused by individual cars, because even if a
single car is driving too slowly for the comfort of other drivers,
they are not forced to stay behind it, but can move around it
freely, as they could not in the case of a traffic jam (Kerner,
1998). Other properties of collections of individuals, such as
electorates that exist at a higher level of organization than the
parts, are not in themselves emergent properties, since electoral
powers are as true of a mere aggregate of the individuals as of
an overall electorate, whose causal properties are reducible to the
aggregate of causal powers of individual voters (Ellis, 2012). One
might say that the “emergent” causal powers exist because the
individuals are arranged in a particular pattern, and that property
is true of the individuals as aggregated. It is true that a particular
arrangement of individuals has led to the “emergent” properties.
These properties, however, are previously unseen in nature, and
were not predictable from knowledge of possible aggregates of
individuals. They appear, moreover, spontaneously out of chaotic
states of individuals, and are not composed by external intelligent
agents. Thus, these patterns with their novel properties can be
said to emerge from chaotic states because of causal powers of
their own.
The concept of emergent properties is now so well-established
that it has tempted some to apply the term in cases where the
“agents” are not well-understood: for example, consciousness has
been called an emergent property in humans and some non-
human animals. This would be an appealing way to solve the
hard problem of consciousness, if the “agents” that would self-
organize to produce it are known. They are presumably states
of the brain, but unlike individual cars in the traffic pattern case
they have never been observed to create the emergent property of
consciousness in which they could be found. Emergent properties
are properties of groups of entities that can be observed as part
of the final form, not losing their material nature. In the case
of consciousness, it seems that no individual entities, or agents,
are in any way observable or detectable in conscious experience,
which manifests a unity for the conscious agent.
Understanding, however, as we have been using the term, is
an emergent property of biological processes. The entities that
lead to forming an understanding of something are detectable,
and can be analyzed out of the experience of understanding. An
experience of understanding contains, at least, motor imagery
of familiar action patterns, a mental state of puzzlement or
tension followed by a relaxing of the mind into the structure
and affordances of what is understood, and confidence in the
planning of future actions related to the entities or situations now
understood. The state of understanding as a whole, moreover,
has causal powers (in a given situation) that its components,
representations of action patterns, do not have. A satisfying
feeling of understanding, such as the “Aha” experience is
accompanied by images or representations of action patterns,
which the subject uses metaphorically to interpret the novel state
of affairs—object or event. These representations may not be the
most prominent aspects of the experience, in which attention
would be focused on the newly-understood state of affairs. But
they are introspectively available. In themselves, these action
representations do not constitute understanding of the novel
situation, but together with representations of the current stimuli
do combine to form a whole scenario that is understood.Without
the emergence of understanding, as it is presented here, normal
human life would be impossible; one would literally never know
what to do. The components of understanding must unite for any
functioning in the world to occur.
One source of evidence for the role of action representations
is the work of McNeill (1992), who studies the role of gesture in
expressing such representations:
For example, consider a speaker who says, “I was holding a big
box” and produces a gesture that mimes holding a big box. In
this case, both modalities express the same idea, so the degree
of redundancy between gesture and speech is high. The gesture
also expresses additional nuances ofmeaning, such as information
about the position of the hands as they hold the box, but the
semantic information expressed in the two modalities is largely
overlapping. At the other end of the continuum are cases in
which there is little or no semantic overlap between the two
modalities. In one often-cited example, a speaker describing a
scene from a Sylvester and Tweety cartoon said, “she chases him
out again” while swinging her arm as if wielding a weapon. In
fact, the speaker was describing a scene in which Granny chases
Sylvester while swinging an umbrella. In this example, the speaker
expresses an aspect of the scene in gesture (swinging the umbrella)
that she does not express at all in speech. Thus, in this case, the
degree of redundancy between gesture and speech is low (Alibalia
et al., 2009).
On this account the speakers are expressing in gestures the motor
imagery they are using to describe a scene. The use of gestures
indicate that the speaker is thinking of action patterns that she
uses to understand and describe the scene. In the second example,
the speaker is thinking of a component of the scene that she does
not express in words, indicating that she understands the scene
herself in terms of her prior experience of swinging an object in
her hand.
To summarize this section: understanding is a state of mind
that emerges from the blending of other mental states, driven
ultimately by the emotion of wanting to be comfortable in one’s
environment. The mental states of experiencing motor imagery
of action patterns and sensory input from the environment, and
relating these metaphorically to basic action patterns learned
by experience in infancy, create an emergent state of confident
action planning which would be impossible if these components
were not united by the emotional drive to be “at home” in the
world.
SELF-ORGANIZED UNDERSTANDING
What elements are self-organized in the case of understanding?
The basic constituents are the simple bodily movements
themselves. After mastering the reach-grasp-pull pattern, an
infant soon finds that the pattern can be extended in various
ways, such as grasping two small things at once between reach
and pull. We can say that the larger pattern (reach-grasp-grasp-
pull) is self-organized if a) the change was not conceived by the
infant in advance, but was a spontaneous extra-grasp addition to
the original pattern—in other words, the repeated grasp creates
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a higher order pattern reach-GRASP-pull, with the intervening
GRASP now encompassing two smaller iterations.; and b) the
process is recursive, in that components of the original pattern
are used to construct an emergent pattern within the same
structure. We assume here that the infant is not thinking out this
plan in advance, but is responding to a motivation—to obtain the
toys—in a somewhat automatic way.
Let us look at higher-level processes of understanding.
Take Searle’s example of a person in the Chinese Room.
His instructions are to take the input, consisting of Chinese
characters, look them up in a book, and return the prescribed
different set of characters through the output slot. Certainly
he doesn’t understand the characters. But he does have a clear
understanding of what he is supposed to do. Not only can he
express them in English (as he does in his article), he understands
them in terms of our basic pattern of reach-grasp-pull. He reaches
for them as they come in the input slot, grasps them, and pulls
them to him and looks at them. This case of understanding is,
of course, very simple, and probably minimally conscious. The
notion that reach-grasp-pull clearly applies here, and can be
clearly extended to apply to any abstract cognitive tasks in the
“grasp” mode.
I have described the application of pre-learned sensorimotor
patterns to examples of simple tasks to make clear the recursive
activities involved in a range of cases of emergent understanding.
One more aspect of understanding, seen as a recursive activity
built upon basic patterns, is the motivation that leads the
understanding subject to apply the patterns, with growing
sophistication, to the constantly arriving new states of affairs that
must be incorporated into the subject’s world view. How do we
know to keep applying the same basic patterns to novel input?
We need a concept to express the growing facility with which we
incorporate novel states of affairs into our world-view. Why do
we not struggle for understanding in the case of radically novel
input, not to mention the constantly changing environment with
which we are confronted moment by moment? Not only is there
normally no struggle, but the basis for understanding a novel
state of affairs is in place before we can puzzle over the scene. The
general schema for understanding our world allows an even flow
from one scene to another, seamlessly, because we are motivated
to “look for” such a framework before the event of new sensory
input.
The recursive building activity that lets us feel at home in the
familiar but changing world is known as stigmergy. As Camazine
et al. (2001) explains, referring to stigmergy:
[a] process of decentralized coordination ... where individuals
respond to stimuli provided by the emerging structure itself can
be a rich source of information for the individual. In other words,
information from the local environment and work-in-progress
can guide [and motivate through positive feedback] further
activity. As a structure such as a termite mound develops, the state
of the building process continually provide[s] new information
for the builders (p. 23).
The preceding quotation applied in the original to termites, but it
can apply equally well to cognitive understanding in an intelligent
individual. As we grow in the world, novel conditions inspire
more use of sensorimotor patterns to understand them. Like
a growing termite mound, our growing understanding of the
world, via stigmergy, supplies a conscious sense of satisfaction
and guards against confusion at first encountering the new
situation. The individual termites have innate instructions that
lead each one to coordinate its activities with the others, while
being unaware of the activities of the others and focusing on its
own tasks. In the case of us humans, we need more conscious
motivators; our pattern-use is not a result of blind innate drives.
Our motivators, as mentioned earlier, are conscious feelings of
satisfaction and discomfort. We are normally uncomfortable
when confused, and seek understanding. When we have achieved
that, we are satisfied; our work at building our extended world
is completed. We seek to be at home in the world, not at a loss.
When at home, we know what we can do next. We can simply say
that the more we understand the better we feel.
So far I have discussed the use of sensorimotor patterns to
incorporate novel situations into a given cognitive framework.
Sometimes, more rarely, there appear cases of true novelty,
structure-breaking events that require almost complete re-
evaluation in terms of the subject’s previous system of
understanding. All of a sudden all the lights go out. It is pitch-
dark outside my open window, and surrounding me inside.
Nothing has prepared me for this. It is as though I have gone
blind in an instant. There are no clues as to what I should, or
even can, do. What next?
My own physical body is my sole remaining anchor. I can
take stock of where my limbs are and what objects I can touch.
Two new interpretations are available to me: I am totally blind,
or something has happened to the light sources outside me. The
latter seems a more hopeful option; I try to construct plausible
scenarios, and finally find one involving unnoticed growing
lateness of the hour (the outside darkness), and a major electrical
fuse blowing (the inside darkness). That works.
In true novelty, when I would not have even my body to
anchor me, there might be no plausible scenario. In such an
extreme case, with no familiar structures to turn to, I could
only search my cognitive repertoire for some logically possible
explanation, in terms of what I am acquainted with. If that search
failed, as it would with no proprioceptive input whatever, I can
suppose that only blind panic would take over. That state is
unimaginable to a normally embodied subject (like this author).
A brave attempt to imagine it can be found in the novel “Zero
K” (DeLillo, 2016, p.155ff) when a newly disembodied subject
first awakens to her situation). The conclusion I draw is that the
body is foundational for any self-aware cognition with which to
construct some degree of understanding. With the body I can
tell some sort of story; without the body, there is nothing—even
memories of embodiment would not locate me now. Truly novel
situations are possible only against a background of minimal
familiarity; take that away, and subjective cognitive activity
must cease. But with some element of familiarity, which must
include some degree of embodiment, a possible world might
be constructed to fit my experience. Understanding requires
embodiment, and thus any understanding will be structured by
actual or possible bodily actions (Boden, 1990).
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 7 March 2017 | Volume 11 | Article 8
Newton Understanding and Self-Organization
Returning to the subject of self-organization, one might argue
that the preceding is not an explanation of self-organization,
since we, the subjects, consciously monitor the construction
of understanding, which means that the successive states of
applyingmotor patterns to our environment are not independent
of “intervention by external directing influences.” And it is true
that the subject of the understanding is consciously trying to
understand, motivated by a need, and that she therefore accepts
or rejects candidate patterns with which to organize the new data.
Nevertheless, she selects or rejects by means of her conscious
feelings only, and not by an independent standard of fitness of
the pattern with what has gone before. She need not know that
the successful pattern is a metaphor for the basic patterns of
movement that she has carried with her from infancy (and as I
have discovered, may well deny it when it is suggested to her!).
Here is a personal example: I was trying to convince a colleague
that his memory of a bad experience at a party was structured
by a sensorimotor pattern from earlier experiences, and that his
memory of the party was composed of representations of those
experiences, and not of purely linguistic representations such as
“I had a bad time at the party.” He denied it, so I asked “when you
think of the party, is there any bodily reaction that you are aware
of?” and he answered “I wince.” That convinced him (at least
partially) that such memories are not independent of personal
patterns of reactions to unpleasantness.
The point is that the unpleasant experiences used to structure
the memory of the party, and motivate the wincing, were in
place before my colleague reacted to them. The feelings of
satisfaction that arise when we find a pattern with which to
interpret anything new are automatic, and we can then proceed
to use our understanding with confidence, knowing that we have
successfully expanded our experienced world. And, as we see with
the example of sudden, complete sensory deprivation, motivation
to construct a pattern would be baseless, and could not begin.
To be a self is, necessarily, to be located with respect to an
environment. If that is gone, nothing remains.
CONCLUSION: UNDERSTANDING AS A
SELF-ORGANIZING PROCESS
Imagine what it would be like if all minute-to-minute attempts
at understanding of our experienced environment were fully
conscious and deliberate. There would be no comfortable feeling
of being “at home” in the world. Instead, there would be constant
confusion and uncertainty, at worst a deep fear of the immediate
future as something we cannot, but must, prepare for. In Being
and Time, Heidegger describes the state of humans, Dasein, as
Being-in-the-World:
In the projecting of understanding, entities are disclosed in
their possibility. The character of the possibility corresponds,
on each occasion, with the kind of Being of the entity which
is understood. Entities within the world generally are projected
upon the world—that is, upon a whole of significance, to whose
reference relations concern, as Being-in-the-world, has been tied
up in advance. When entities within-the-world are discovered
along with the Being of Dasein—that is, when they have come
to be understood—we say that they have meaning [Sinn]. But
that which is understood, taken strictly, is not the meaning but
the entity, or alternatively, Being. Meaning is that wherein the
intelligibility of something maintains itself (Heidegger, 1927).
In Heidegger’s terms, lacking an understanding of the kind
of Being of an encountered entity is lacking a knowledge
of one’s possibility in this novel situation. But awareness of
one’s possibilities of acting is precisely what makes a situation
comfortable; we are “at home” in the world when we know what
we can do next. Not knowing that would be a condition of fear
and hopelessness; our environment would be meaningless. As the
quoted passage implies, the significance of our world has been
“set up in advance,” meaning that as we move through time we
bring with us the structures through which we can understand
novel entities. Thus, finding a structure for interpreting newly-
encountered entities is not a constant anxiety-ridden necessity
but, we may say, a self-organized process that can guarantee our
unbroken comfort in our world. This means that the process
must be self-organizing, for otherwise we would have no time for
acting upon possibilities, but would be in constant destabilizing
fear. The conditions for understanding, the “significance of
our world” are essential for the existence of possibilities. If
dependent upon our conscious organizing powers, each new
present moment would be a new cause for alienation and anxiety.
That we are not, as a rule, constantly in that state of extreme
anxiety, seems to be strong evidence that understanding is a
self-organizing process.
Many of the arguments in Sections (a) through (c) are given
fuller treatment in Newton (1996).
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